mirror of
https://codeberg.org/reverse-skill-lab/apk-reverse
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e151d7d6056d14aa25d96e2f63fde1363d3049fc
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Commits
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d0fe0ea337 |
Harden the path audit, generalise three absolute paths, and gate the corpus size
An external review found the evidence record honest and the gates real, but raised three
concrete defects. Each is fixed at its cause rather than at its symptom, and the reasoning
is recorded in docs/tool-verification/REPO-DECISIONS.md.
build_scripts.py -- the audit reported 37 findings, most of them noise
It matched any `X:\...` literal, so `C:\Program Files\...`, `C:\Python314\...` and literal
placeholders all counted as machine-specific leftovers. A gate whose output is mostly noise
stops being read -- the same failure scan_leaks.py names when it refuses to exempt the
RFC 5737 ranges. Two explicit exemption families are added instead of a looser regex:
GENERIC_PATH_PREFIXES (install locations that exist on every host of that platform) and
`_leaks_nothing()` (also exempts an already-redacted path, since a placeholder or an
ellipsis means a normalisation pass already ran).
Two traps surfaced only because the change was tested rather than merely run. BARE_ABS stops
at whitespace, so `C:\Program Files\...` arrives truncated as `C:\Program` and a one-way
`startswith` misses the exemption; the comparison is now bidirectional under a minimum
length. And with a lookahead of only `[a-z0-9]` the optional `\\?` backtracks to empty, the
next character is the separator, it passes, and a real personal path is swallowed -- the
lookahead has to exclude the separator as well. Both were caught by the case table, not by
the audit run.
Result: 37 -> 0 findings, exit 2 -> exit 0. The real hits (`E:\apk-reverse\...`,
`E:\agb_apktool.jar`) were fixed in the documents, not by widening the list.
Three absolute paths on the published surface
EXTENSION-desensitization.md, EXTENSION-extraction-shell-bench.md and EXTENSION-vmp-diff.md
quoted a workbench root, a tool jar and an SDK location absolutely.
docs/tool-verification/ already states the rule -- a record may say a run happened at a
`tools/...` path, written relatively -- so the three files were made to match the rule they
were already under. The tool-jar and SDK cases are rephrased rather than placeholder-ised,
so no reader has to learn a new token.
check_budget.py -- blind to the half of the problem it was not measuring
The gate budgets the always-loaded part and could not see the corpus, where a new reference
costs exactly one index line: the corpus can double while the narrative count stays green.
Two note-level thresholds now report it. Notes, not failures -- a large corpus is a choice,
a growth nobody measured is the defect. The first run reports 47 references + 55 scripts =
102 files, 31,423 lines.
A cross-tool inconsistency this pass ran into, recorded rather than papered over
build_scripts.py now exempts any `<...>` placeholder; scan_leaks.py recognises a fixed token
list. An invented placeholder in a source comment passed the first and was read by the
second as the very personal name its `user_path_windows` rule exists to catch, turning
check_repo.py red. That is by design -- a strict list is what stops a real name hiding
behind a plausible-looking placeholder -- but the two tools disagree about what "already
redacted" means, and the disagreement stays invisible until someone writes a new token.
Rephrased here; a future pass may want one shared list.
Verification
- build_scripts.py: 37 -> 0 findings on a clean clone, exit 0.
- An 18-case table pins both directions, 0 failures: generic and already-redacted paths are
exempt, while a real workbench path, a real personal name after `C:\Users\`, a real POSIX
home and a real project path still report. It found two defects in the first
implementation.
- All four gates pass: check_repo 0 problem, check_refs 0 dangling / 0 warning,
check_budget 0 failure / 0 warning / 3 notes, build_scripts 0 findings.
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6cffc3d2ac |
Absorption pass: take the mechanics from four external skill repositories, keep our discipline
Four projects were cloned for comparison (reverse-skill, awesome-game-security,
android-reverse-engineering-claude-skill, MobileRE-Skill) and read for what they do that this
repository does not. None is vendored and none becomes a runtime dependency: what crosses over is a
phase order, a checklist or a command pattern, with the source URL and the retrieval date recorded in
the file that absorbed it.
The rule applied to every candidate: does this make a judgement easier or a verification harder? The
repository is a decision-and-verification layer, and the four things kept are all of that kind.
new scripts/scan_leaks.py target identity scanned before publishing, with an explicit
do-not-anonymize list and four RESULT=/exit states
new references/precedents/ the positive half of the record: route including dead ends, a
grade per assertion, measured pits, and a write-back checklist
new scripts/svc_scan.py does a libc-level hook structurally see this call at all
new scripts/anti_detect_probe.js observer-only: name the check, and report the environment it reads
new references/desensitization-and-leak-scans.md
new references/dart-aot.md sections the 32-bit snapshot's real string-record format
check_repo.py now delegates the identity scan to scripts/scan_leaks.py and runs it over
git ls-files, so the gate reads content instead of layout for the first time. An explicit file list
cannot be narrowed by the default work-area exemptions -- that defect was caught by the gate itself.
Two claims that this repository had already written down turned out to be wrong, and both are
recorded as refuted rather than quietly rewritten:
dart-aot.md the armv7 string table was documented as [len*2 u32le][UTF-16LE]. It is not. The same
extractor keeps 4,980 chained entries on arm64 and zero on armv7, and the byte layer
shows the 32-bit record is [header u32][byte-count u32le][UTF-8 payload]: two adjacent
literals carry 0x46 (70) and 0x48 (72), exactly their byte lengths. The zero was a
format mismatch, not an empty table. The engine-version banner on the same target is
66 bytes of "0.0.1" with a blank build id, so the documented regex returns a
version-shaped lie.
leak scan the pass that added the scanner found 26 strong hits inside its own evidence file on
the day it was written -- the fixture's literal match values, quoted to prove the
rules fire. The corpus may contain values; the published surface may not.
Measured, not asserted. The check that fires was named on a public MASTG target: three arms with one
variable, the control alive at the end and the probe arm dead in about 300 ms, with strstr("frida") at
t=303 ms and no tombstone. Reproducibility is bounded honestly -- one full sequence in three arms, on
a target whose whole window is sub-second. svc_scan.py's two independent decoders agree on an
identical 214-site set, and ptrace-free dumping gained a negative boundary: a target whose dex is
deflated inside its APK has no whole-image dex in memory to export, for reasons that say nothing about
protection.
Also in this pass: the detector-locating pipeline (detection-and-anti-analysis.md Step 3) with its
branch conditions; the layered Java-to-svc descent and the dump's honesty boundary in
advanced-unpacking.md; a sourced capability-gap list in toolchain.md where every row is graded
URL-verified or measured; the RESULT=-token convention; and SKILL.md opening with an immediate-action
block, because the symptom index and the gates were sitting in the part of a long file nobody reads.
Gates: check_repo.py 0 problem, check_refs.py 0 dangling / 0 warning, check_budget.py 0 failure /
0 warning / 1 pre-existing note. The scan reports RESULT=leaks_found_strong_only, exit 0: four
endpoint/weak hits, all of them addresses from the RFC 5737 documentation range in usage examples.
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